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Knowledge, Despite Evidence to the Contrary*
Plato claimed, in the Meno (97a—98c), that knowledge is more valuable
than true belief in virtue of it being more stable than true belief. Knowledge,
Plato argued, is a more reliable guide to action than true belief: the traveler who
knows the way to Larissa is less likely to make a wrong turn (or to give wrong
directions) than the traveler who has amere true belief of the way to Larissa, be-
cause known truths are— andmerely believed truths aren’t— tethered to one’s
mind1 by an explanation of why they are true (aitias logismos).2 In other places
(e.g., inRepublic 412e ff.) Plato also seems to have claimed that a truth, once teth-
ered, is not easily (or perhaps ever) untethered by counterevidence.3 The main
*I wrote this paper to honor Peter Klein, the best philosopher I have ever met, and one of the best people I have
evermet. Peter wasmy thesis advisor at Rutgers; he is also amentor, and the best friendmywork has ever had. Peter
made me believe I could (sometimes) do philosophy, and that philosophy was something worth doing. During the
eight years I was at Rutgers, Peter and I met once or twice every month during the academic year to discuss my
work. We discussed every issue in this paper (andmore, muchmore) innumerable times over that period. We didn’t
always agree, but Peter always taught me something valuable. I cherish those lessons and I will be forever grateful
to Peter for having given them to me.
1Plato’s discussion of the difference in value between knowledge and true belief famously relates knowledge
and true belief to Daedalus statues, which, if not tethered, were said to run out and escape their base. A true belief,
argued Plato, is like an untethered Daedalus statue — beautiful but prone to escaping its owner. An instance of
knowledge, on the other hand, is like a Daedalus statue that is tethered — beautiful and not likely to escape its
owner.
2I am aware of the pitfalls of trying to translate ‘aitias logismos,’ but Iwill not discuss themhere. For an excellent
discussion of some of the main exegetical issues surrounding the translation this expression, see Fine (2004).
3For example, inRepublic 534b Plato seems to argue that knowledge is immune to counterevidence, while mere
true belief is not, because the latter, but not the former, may be essentially based on false beliefs. Because mere
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goal of this paper is to understand when, if ever, knowledge is, to use Plato’s
expression, untethered by evidence suggesting that what one knows is false.
The idea that knowledge is not defeated by counterevidence enjoys some
popularity among contemporary philosophers. For example, NormanMalcolm
(1952, p.185—186) wondered whether there is any evidence that should be al-
lowed to lower his confidence in a proposition he says he knows; that there is
an ink—bottle in front of him. Malcolm concluded his rumination thus (em-
phases are all his):
... I should regard nothing as evidence that there is no ink—bottle here
now... [This] describes my present attitude towards the statement that
here is an ink—bottle. ... My present attitude toward that statement is
radically different frommypresent attitude toward ... other statements
(e.g., that I have a heart). I donow admit that certain future occurrences
would disprove the latter. Whereas no imaginable future occurrence
would be considered by me now as proving that there is not an ink—
bottle here. These remarks are notmeant to be autobiographical. They
are meant to throw light on the common concepts of evidence, proof,
and disproof. (Malcolm, 1952, p.181—2)
According to Malcolm, the case highlights the strong sense of ‘know.’ He
contrasts a strong sense of ‘know’ with a weak sense of that word. Central to
Malcolm’s distinction is the idea that the weak sense of ‘know’ allows for the
possibility of refutation, while the strong sense does not. For example, when
one says that one knows that 92 times 16 is 1,472, but one is not sure this is the
case (say, because one did the calculation in one’s head), ‘know’ is being used in
its weak sense; when one says that one knows that 2 plus 2 is 4, one is sure this
true beliefs can depend essentially on false beliefs, they may be undermined by new truths; this is not the case with
knowledge, which depends exclusively on what is true. See (Fine, 2004, sec. viii) for a discussion of this point.
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is the case and ‘know’ is being used in its strong sense.4 I will make a similar
suggestion about knowledge below. However, unlikeMalcolm, who focused on
the ordinary use of ‘know,’ my focus will be on the concept of knowledge.
I
We can easily reproduce cases that seemingly show that knowledge may be re-
tained in the face of counterevidence. Consider:
Headache
Liz has a throbbing headache. On her way to the medicine cabinet she
bumps into her father, a psychiatrist, who proceeds to tell Liz that she
does not have a headache. He argues that Liz’s subconscious mind is
playing tricks on her in order to allowher to dealwith the sudden death
of her dog, Fifi.5
Although the testimony of Liz’s father provides her with counterevidence to
her knowledge that she has a headache, that does not defeat the justification she
4Malcolm is making another distinction with his case. Although he is primarily interested in the synchronic
features of the case (i.e., he is interested in what it is now rational for him to think about possible counterevidence
to his knowledge that there is an ink—bottle in front of him), he acknowledges that one could also take an interest
in the diachronic features of the case (i.e., one could be interested in what Malcolm would do, in the future, if he
were confronted with evidence suggesting there was no ink—bottle in front of him). Malcolm says that he is not
talking about the diachronic features of his situation, and he concedes that he cannot confidently predict now how
hewould behave in the futurewere he to encounter evidence suggesting that there is no ink—bottle in front of him.
For all he knows, says Malcolm, he would ‘become mad’ or ‘fall into a swoon’ if someone he trusts were to say that
ink—bottle hallucinations are quite common for people in his circumstances. See (Kripke, 2011) and (Borges, 2015)
for a discussion of how heeding this distinction may prevent one frommisunderstanding the charge of dogmatism
that is usually leveled against strong views of knowledge such as the one discussed byMalcolm.
5I don’t mean this case to presuppose that headaches are luminous states (i.e., states that are such that, if one
is in one of them, then one is in a position to know one is in them). Maybe headaches are luminous; maybe they
aren’t. The claim that they are is irrelevant for my case. Clearly, we are sometimes in a position to know we have
a headache; I mean this case to be about one of those times. I mention this because Timothy Williamson (2000)
has persuasively argued that there are no luminous states. His argument does not preclude the claim that one is
sometimes in a position to know one is in a certain mental state, though. But see Greenough and Pritchard (2009)
for criticism ofWilliamson’s argument against luminosity.
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has for believing she has a headache. The case illustrates Malcolm’s point that
(strong) knowledge is not defeated by counterevidence. Here’s another case that
seems to make the same point:
Weather
Liz is looking at a sunny afternoon through the window in her study
while listening to a DVRedWeather Channel forecast from last night.
The forecaster said, then, and with a fair amount of certainty, that it
wouldbe raining rightnow(i.e., at the timeLiz is listening to the record-
ing).
The fact that the forecaster said itwouldbe raining at the timeLiz iswatching
the recording amounts to counterevidence to Liz’s knowledge that it is sunny
outside. Moreover, she knows that the forecaster said that it would be raining
by the time she is listening to the recording. This does not seem to change the
fact that Liz is justified in believing that it is sunny outside, and, since it is true
that it is sunny outside, she knows that it is.6 In short, Liz seems entitled not to
change the confidence she places in the proposition that it is sunny outside even
though she encountered counterevidence for the claim that it is.
Like Plato and Malcolm, I also feel attracted to the claim that knowledge is
sometimes justifiably retained in the face of counterevidence to what one knows
—Headache andWeather tell me this much.
II
In contrast with the Plato—Malcolm tradition that takes knowledge to be inde-
feasible, a different (and at least equally as influential) tradition takes knowledge
6Of course, I am also supposing that there is no funny business of the Gettier type going on here. The same is
true of all the other cases in this paper.
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to be defeasible. Gilbert Harman, Timothy Williamson, and many others have
given voice to this tradition.7 For instance, here isWilliamsonmaking quite suc-
cinctly the point that knowledge is defeasible :
The assumption [that knowledge can be added but not subtracted over
time] is obviously false in practice, because we sometimes forget. But
even if the model is applied to elephants, idealized subjects who never
forget, the assumption that [knowledge] cannot be lost is implausible.
On any reasonable theory of [knowledge], an empirical proposition
which now counts as [knowledge] can subsequently lose its status as
[knowledge] without any forgetting, if future evidence casts sufficient
doubt on it.8
This point is usually backed up by examples such as this:9
Marbles
Mary puts a red and a blackmarble in a bag. She shakes the bagwell and
proceeds to make draws with replacement while carefully taking notes
of the result of each draws. Each of Mary’s first one thousand draws
produce a red marble.10
7For example, JaakkoHintikka (1962, p.20), claims that ‘whoever says “I know that p” proposes to disregard the
possibility that further information would lead him to deny that p.’ Peter Klein (2017), and Roy Sorensen (2012),
also endorse the view that knowledge is defeasible. I will discuss Peter Klein’s views below.
8(Williamson, 2000, p.206).
9Gibert Harman (1973, p.192) does just that in the following passage:
That undermining evidence ... is relevant ... to the acquisition of knowledge [and] also to its main-
tenance is clear from the ... example concerning Tom and the library detective. The detective knows
that he saw Tom steal the book and so he testifies to the Judicial Council. After he leaves the hearing,
Tom’s mother fabricates her story about Tom’s twin brother. Her lying testimony convinces the Judi-
cial Council but is unknown to the detective back at his post in the library. [O]nce Tom’s mother has
... testified, it is no longer true that the detective knows that Tom stole the book.
10Marbles is a variation of a case discussed byWilliamson (2000, p.205).
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The natural reaction toMarbles seems to be something like this: although
Mary knows, at first, that there is a red and a blackmarble in the bag, after draw-
ing a red marble one thousand times Mary ceases to know that this is the case,
even though, by stipulation, this is true. Her evidential situation changes as the
case progresses, however. She starts the case with excellent evidence for the claim
that the bag has both a red and a black marble, but each time Mary draws a
red marble from the bag, she acquires a small piece of counterevidence to the
claim that the bag has both a red and a black marble. By the one—thousandth
time she draws a red marble, the small pieces of counterevidence have added
up tomore counterevidence than her knowledge—level justification could bear.
Mary’s knowledge that there is a red and a black marble in the bag is thus de-
feated; its justification dies a death by one thousand counterevidential cuts.11
Knowledge, Marbles suggests, is not completely tethered, or fixed; it is in fact
somewhat loose and may, as it were, be pushed out of one’s mind. The line of
reasoning in this reaction toMarbles is intuitive, and apparently in tensionwith
the idea that knowledge is tethered or stable. We will get back to this tension
below.
Here onemight feel inclined to complain and say that the case is too implau-
sible to support the epistemic point I am making. After all, what is the chance
that someone will draw the same red marble one thousand times in a row?!12 In
order to assuage these fears, wemay consider an analogous case that takes care of
this issue.
Marbles*
Things are as before except for the fact that Mary’s draws are red or
11N.B. I am not making a claim about exactlywhat impact each draw has on her justification; the impact of each
draw is plausibly really small. The point, rather, is that the sum of all one thousand draws intuitively does have a
major impact on her justification. Thanks to Cherie Braden for discussion here.
12Answer: small — 0.51000.
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black more or less at the rate one would expect (i.e., more or less half
of the time). After doing this for a couple dozen times, Mary’s reli-
able friend, Larry, walks into the room and says, ‘You probably drank
tainted water. Two in every three bottles of water in the kitchen have
been tainted with a hallucinogenic substance that causes people to hal-
lucinate the wrong color of objects — they think non—red objects are
red! You have been drinking from a bottle you got from the kitchen,
right? So, it’s likely that you drank the tainted water.’ Suppose that
Larry’s testimony is true and thatMary has no reason to doubt him—
quite the opposite, Mary has all the reason to trust him, since he is a
good reliable friend andMary knows that. Suppose also thatMary did
not drink from the tainted water.
Larry’s testimony amounts to counterevidence toMary’s knowledge that there
is a red and a black marble in the bag. What is more, although we are supposing
it to be true that there is a red and a blackmarble in the bag, it seems that Larry’s
testimony defeats the justification Mary had for being confident that there is a
red and black marble in the bag. One way to put this is to say that Larry’s testi-
mony made it implausible for Mary to neglect the possibility that she drank the
tainted water and that shemight be hallucinating having put a redmarble in the
bag. It seems that this is enough to lower the justificationMary had for this claim
below the threshold required for knowledge.
While thePlato—Malcolm tradition and cases such asWeather andHeadache
suggest that counterevidence cannot lower one’s justification below the thresh-
old required for knowledge, the Harman—Williamson tradition and cases such
asMarbles/Marbles* suggests the exact opposite.
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III
The clash between these two views of knowledge is captured in the following
two claims:
(C1) Knowledge is never defeated by counterevidence.
(C2) Knowledge is sometimes (but not always) defeated by counterevidence.
A word of warning is warranted before we progress. I do not mean for the
discussion so far to be taken as ‘conclusive evidence’ or even as ‘strong evidence’
for (C1) and (C2). Rather, the discussion so far illustrates what epistemologists
who accept (C1) and (C2) have in mind when they argue for those claims. The
Plato—Malcolm tradition seems to think that the indefeasibility of knowledge
is what explains (at least in part) why knowledge is more valuable than true be-
lief. The Harman—Williamson tradition, on the other hand, seems to believe
that the defeasibility of knowledge is a consequence of subjects taking evidence
seriously. In a sense, the first tradition emphasizes the dierence in quality be-
tween the grounds for knowledge and grounds for mere true belief, while the
latter tradition emphasizes what those grounds have in common.
(C1) and (C2) cannot both be true, of course. However, both claims can be
false at the same time: if knowledge is always defeated by counterevidence, then
it is false that it is never defeated or that it is sometimes but not always so de-
feated. Although there are costs and benefits associated with accepting one of
those claims and rejecting the other, I take it thatWeather andHeadache show
quite conclusively that the idea that knowledge is always defeated by counterev-
idence is not very plausible. But, more generally, if one’s epistemology allows for
the partial defeat of evidential support, thenknowledge is not always defeatedby
counterevidence, even if evidential support is always so defeated. Letme explain.
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Sincewhat gets defeated by counterevidence is the epistemic support one’s belief
receives from one’s evidence (i.e., one’s justification), if one can know something
even if the probability of the proposition believed given one’s evidence is lower
than 1, then counterevidence will not always defeat knowledge: if S can know
that p when the probability that p is true given S’s evidence is, say, .95, then the
probability that p is true conditional on S’s evidence may decrease from, say, .98
to .96 in virtue of some counterevidence without S ceasing to know that p.13
There are at least a couple of costs associated with accepting (C1). One of
them is having to explain away the intuition that Mary’s knowledge in Mar-
bles/Marbles* is destroyed by counterevidence.14 The clear benefit of accepting
(C1), on the other hand, is arguably methodological. (C1) is simple (i.e., there
is no need to find a principled way to distinguish between situations in which
knowledge is defeated by counterevidence from situations in which knowledge
is not defeated by counterevidence) and easily falsifiable (i.e., one case in which
knowledge is defeated by counterevidence is sufficient to falsify C1). (C1) also fits
nicely with the Platonic idea that knowledge is stable in a way that true belief is
not, for, according to (C1), knowledge is not only stable but it simply cannot be
moved by evidence to the contrary.
As for (C2), the obvious cost associatedwith this view of knowledge is one of
providing a principled way to distinguish situations in which counterevidence
defeats knowledge from situations in which it does not. We could get rid of
13Be that as it may, all cases discussed in this paper deal with categorical, rather than partial, defeat. That is, with
respect to all cases discussed in this paper, I am supposing that the potential defeating effect of counterevidence is
always such that it lowers the subject’s degree of justification below the threshold required for knowledge.
14There is another, less obvious, potential cost of accepting (C1). That is the danger of dogmatism and the re-
jection of an intuitive notion of intellectual humility: if knowledge is indefeasible, why should one pay attention
to counterevidence to what one knows? Isn’t all counterevidence to what one knows misleading evidence? This
problem for views that accept (C1) was put forward by Saul Kripke in a talk in the early 1970s. (Harman, 1973) made
a similar problem popular. (Kripke, 2011) includes Kripke’s talk as well as an appendix explaining the difference
between his version of the problem and Harman’s. Since I dealt with this issue in (Borges, 2015), I will not discuss
it here again.
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this cost by emending (C2) and suggesting that counterevidence always destroys
knowledge, but that emendation would, I take it, make (C2) way too implausi-
ble — asHeadache andWeather suggest. On the other hand, the benefit of ac-
cepting (C2) does not seem to be methodological simplicity, but something like
ﬁtness, since it seems to fit our intuitive judgment about all the caseswe discussed
so far — it takes those cases as data to be explained rather than to be explained
away) and, if correct, accounts for the intuitive judgment that knowledge is not
defeated inWeather andHeadache, and the judgment that knowledge is defeated
inMarbles/Marbles*.
Before we move forward, it is useful to distinguish between two different
ideas we might want to convey when we say that someone’s knowledge is de-
feated by counterevidence. On the one hand, when we say that S’s knowledge
that p is defeated by some counterevidence, e, wemaymean to say that S’s learn-
ing that e is the case caused her to stop believing that p. On the other hand, when
we say that S’s knowledge that p is defeated by some counterevidence, e, we may
mean to say that S’s learning that e is the case lowers S’s degree of justiﬁcation
for believing that p below the threshold required for knowledge. One can lose
knowledge because of counterevidence in either of those two ways: by ceasing
to believe or by having one’s justification lowered below the threshold required
for knowledge.15 What is more, although those two ways in which knowledge
15For simplicity’s sake, in drawing this distinction I am presupposing that knowing that p entails believing that
p. I think that even if one rejected this presupposition one could still draw the relevant distinction, although doing
so would bemore complicated. What Imean is that the distinction is compatible with the view, sometimes exposed
by knowledge firsters, that knowledge cannot be analyzed in terms of belief, truth, etc. The reason why this view is
compatiblewith our distinction is that onemayhold it and still think thatwhenever someone knows that something
is the case that person alsobelieves that it is the case; that is, onemay consistently hold the view thatknowledge cannot
be analyzed in terms of belief while, at the same time, argue that knowing that p is always accompanied by believing
that p (or, alternatively, that the latter state is always a by—product of the former state). If one had this kind of
knowledge first view, one could consistently hold the distinction between what I will call below ‘psychological’ and
‘epistemic defeat.’ (Incidentally, (Fine, 2004) discusses a version of the knowledge first type of view I am sketching
here and suggests one might attribute it to Plato.) I do not have the space to defend these claims here, however. I
will come back to them some other day.
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may be defeated are clearly related (e.g., an awareness of the fact that counterev-
idence lowered one’s justification below the threshold required for knowledge
may cause one to stop believing), it is important to keep them apart when as-
sessing the plausibility of (C1) and (C2). In particular, one may distinguish two
different versions of each claim:
(C1b) Knowledge is never defeated by counterevidence that causes one to stop
believing.
(C1j) Knowledge is never defeated by counterevidence that lowers one’s degree
of justification below the threshold required for knowledge.
(C2b) Knowledge is sometimes (but not always) defeated by counterevidence
that causes one to stop believing.
(C2j) Knowledge is sometimes (but not always) defeated by counterevidence
that lowers one’s degree of justification below the threshold required for
knowledge.
Once we distinguish between these different versions of (C1) and (C2), we
make room for amore nuanced approach to cases like the ones we have been dis-
cussing. For example, one may now argue that, althoughMary’s justification for
believing that there is a black and a red marble in the bag is not lowered by her
coming to know that she drew a redmarble one thousand times, this counterev-
idence may well cause her to lose her belief in the proposition that there is a red
and ablackmarble in thebag. Thiswould involve acceptingboth (C1j) and (C2b).
Call this type of view a strong view of knowledge. Alternatively, one may insist
that the counterevidence in Marbles/Marbles* does lower Mary’s justification
for believing that there is a red and a blackmarble in the bag below the threshold
required for her to know that fact; she also loses her belief in that proposition,
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but the epistemically significant event is that her justification gets defeated. This
approach to the casewould involve accepting both (C2j) and (C2b). Call this type
of view a weak view of knowledge.
Epistemologists who endorse strong views of knowledge believe that knowl-
edge defeat is exclusively a psychological phenomenon in the sense that coun-
terevidence towhat one knows leads one to lose (atmost) one’s belief; they reject
the claim that knowledge defeat is an epistemic phenomenon, however. That is,
they reject the view that sometimes counterevidence to what one knows lowers
one’s justification below the threshold required for knowledge.16
Strong views of knowledge elegantly explain what is going on in our four
cases: although the counterevidence can never epistemically defeat one’s knowl-
edge, subjects in cases such asMarbles/Marbles* have their knowledge psycho-
logically defeated. The challenge for strong views is to explain away the intuition
that Mary’s knowledge inMarbles/Marbles* suffers epistemic defeat, not only
psychological defeat. Following Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2010), I will call the in-
tuition that the knowledge subjects have in cases such as Marbles/Marbles* is
epistemically defeated, defeat intuition. Let us explore this point a little further,
for it will become decisive below when we assess a recent version of the strong
view of knowledge.
The defeat intuition emerging in relation to cases such asMarbles/Marbles*
amounts to an intuition about how justiﬁed the target proposition is for the sub-
ject given her new total evidence (i.e., once she updates her degree of belief in
light of the new evidence she acquires). This means that a theory will do jus-
tice to this intuition only if it tells a story about justiﬁcation (i.e., that which
accounts for a good chunk of the epistemic difference between true belief and
knowledge), rather than if it tells a story about some other — albeit related —
16For versions of the strong view of knowledge, see, among others, (Dretske, 1971), (Dretske, 1981), (Lasonen-
Aarnio, 2010), and (Baker-Hytch & Benton, 2015).
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epistemic desiderata.17
In section five I will argue that a recent version of the strong view of knowl-
edge is unable to account for the defeat intuition in a way that does justice to the
story connecting justification and defeat. I will then offer an alternative account
of the defeat intuition that does justice to this story.
According to epistemologistswhoendorse theweakviewof knowledge, how-
ever, knowledge is vulnerable to both epistemic and psychological defeat. This
type of view also offers an explanation of what is going on in our cases: while
Mary’s knowledge inMarbles/Marbles* suffers epistemic and psychological de-
feat, the knowledge of subjects inWeather andHeadache suffers neither. Weak
views of knowledge have a hard time giving a principled account of when coun-
terevidence is strong enough to lowerone’s justificationbelow the relevant thresh-
old for knowledge. This is an important challenge for a few reasons but no less
because we seem to have a better intuitive grip on whether a subject knows than
we have on whether a subject has a certain degree of epistemic justification and
whether the justification she has is affected by counterevidence in a particular
way. Knowledge—first versions of the weak view may have an advantage over
belief—first versions of the weak view, for knowledge—first versions of the view
pressupose that we have a better grip on knowledge than on justification.
IV
In this section we look at Peter Klein’s version of the weak view of knowledge
— the defeasibility theory of knowledge. Peter has defended a version of the
defeasibility theory of knowledge for over forty—five years now.18 His account
17This is true not only of more traditional versions of the weak view of knowledge (i.e., weak views that take
knowledge tobe analyzed inpart by justification), but also of knowledge—first views such as the one in (Williamson,
2000, ch.10), which says that knowledge is not analyzable but is nonetheless susceptible to epistemic defeat.
18See, among many others, (Klein, 1971), (Klein, 1981), (Klein, 2008), and (Klein, 2017).
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accepts the defeat intuition and is designed to accommodate it. Consider:
(Defeasibility) S knows that p iff (1) p; (2) S believes that p; (3) S is justified in
believing p; (4) there is no truth, d, such that the conjunction of d and S’s
justification, j, fails to justify S in believing that p.
Condition (4) is ano—defeat condition in linewith (C2j) above.19 According
to (4), certain truths (i.e., defeaters) are such that they lower one’s justificationbe-
low the threshold required for knowledge. So, according toDefeasibility,Mary’s
knowledge that there is a red and a blackmarble in the bag is defeated in this way
by the truth that Mary drew a red marble one thousand times.
Defeasibility is a fine exemplar of the weak view of knowledge, with seem-
ingly a lot going for it. For one, the view seems to provide a neat account of cases
where one has a justified true belief but no knowledge; for example, in the Get-
tier cases: in those cases there is a truth that is such that the conjunction of the
subject’s justification with this truth fails to justify the subject in believing the
target proposition. This take on Gettier cases also allows Peter to account for
epistemic luck: it is a matter of luck that the gettiered subject ended up with a
justified true belief, for she could have easily believed the defeater and failed to
know.
There are clouds on the horizon, however. Recently Peter focused on accom-
modating the possibility of inferential knowledge that is essentially based on a
false premise (a ‘useful falsehood,’ as he calls it). As he points out, given con-
dition (4) the problem for Defeasibility is that the negation of the false premise
seems to be a defeater for the subject’s justification. Here’s one such case (adapted
from (Warfield, 2005)):
Handouts
19As far as I know Peter also accepts (C2b), but I will not deal with that aspect of his view here.
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Ted carefully counts the number of people present at his talk and rea-
sons: ‘There are 53 people at my talk; therefore my 100 handout copies
are sufficient.’ His premise is false. There are 52 people in attendance—
Teddouble—counted one personwho changed seats during the count.
At first glance, Defeasibility seems to give the wrong result aboutHandouts
(at least to the extent that we feel inclined to attribute knowledge to Ted): the
truth ‘It is not the case that there are 53 people in attendance’ seems to be just the
kind of truth (4) says is a defeater and, hence, a truth that lowers one’s justifica-
tion below the threshold required for knowledge. The problem is that this ver-
dict dispensed by Defeasibility clashes with people’s intuition that Ted knows.
Peter has replied to cases like Handouts in the following way (Klein, 2017):
in those cases, the truth that seems to defeat the subject’s justification is itself de-
feated by something else the subject knows and that is entailed by the alleged
defeater. So, Ted knows that he has enough handouts because the epistemic
damage ‘It is not the case that there are 53 people in attendance’ could do to
his justification is preempted20 by his knowledge that there are approximately 52
people in attendance. I think this reply toHandouts is promising.21 The key fea-
ture is that something other than the falsehood is what is turning the conclusion
in Ted’s inference into knowledge.22
20In (Klein, 2017, p.54) Peter says that this latter truth ‘restores’ Ted’s justification for believing that he has enough
handouts. I find that confusing— if ‘It is not the case that there are 53 people in attendance’ is not really a defeater,
then there is no damage to be restored by this truth. Instead, what seems to be going on here is that the destructive
effect of ‘It is not the case that there are 53 people in attendance’ is preempted by Ted’s knowledge that there are 52
people in attendance.
21I have given a similar reply toHandoutsmyself in (Borges, 2017). See (de Almeida, 2017) for criticism of Peter’s
way of handling cases of useful falsehoods. For alternative ways of dealing withHandouts as well as with other cases
of knowledge fromnon—knowledge, see, among others, (Ball&BlomeTillmann, 2014), (Montminy, 2014), (Luzzi,
2014), and (Schnee, 2015).
22It may be suggested that Peter should not have been so quick to assume that Ted is ‘epistemically close’ to what
is obviously entailed by something he knows. After all, closure—deniers such as Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick
can reasonably reject the claim about epistemic proximity Peter relies on. This is an important worry about Peter’s
strategy, but I think it can be mitigated. I do not have space to give it a full treatment here; so, a couple of quick
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Theremight be problems for Defeasibility whenwe compare its response to
Handouts with its response toMarbles/Marbles*. Why can’t we say that some-
thing Mary knows prevents her knowledge that there is a red and black marble
from being (epistemically) defeated, like we did with Ted’s knowledge that his
one hundred handouts are enough? After all, is it not the case that Mary saw
that she put a black and a red marble in the bag? Why can’t we take this knowl-
edge to preempt the defeating effect of the counterevidence coming from the
drawings? Saying that Defeasibility can treat those cases differently because the
subject knows the target proposition in one case but not in the other is utterly
unsatisfactory. Supposedly, the analysans in a correct analysis of the concept of
knowledge is more informative than its analysandum. But, if in some cases we
need first to judge whether the analysandum is instantiated before we can learn
whether the analysans is instantiated, then the analysis under consideration is
failing to display that core feature of correct analyses of the concept of knowl-
edge.
This issue generalizes. For example, supposing we want Defeasibility to ac-
commodate the intuitive judgments that the subjects inHeadache andWeather
know, while the subject inMarbles/Marbles* does not know, then we need an
account of why the counterevidence in the latter case defeats the subject’s justifi-
cationwhile the counterevidence in the first two cases does not. Given that in all
remarks will have to do — at least for now. The key point is this: the thing pushing the proposition beyond the
subject’s epistemic reach in counterexamples to closure (e.g., Dretske’s zebra—in—the—zoo case) is not present in
cases of useful falsehood, suggesting that closure does not fail in the latter cases (even if it fails in the former cases).
According to Dretske, knowledge closure fails in his zebra—in—the—zoo case because, although the zoo—goer
has evidence that is good enough to give him knowledge of ‘That’s a zebra’ (e.g., there’s a plaque saying that the
animals in the pen are zebras), his evidence is not good enough to give him knowledge of something that is entailed
by this truth, namely ‘That’s not a cleverly disguised mule.’ For Dretske (and, in related ways, for Nozick as well)
knowledge closure fails in cases where the subject’s evidence, although good enough to produce knowledge of the
entailing proposition, is not good enough to produce knowledge of the entailed one. That is the one thing pushing
the entailed proposition beyond the subject’s epistemic reach. But Ted’s situation is different. The evidence he has
for the falsehood ‘There are 53 people in attendance’ is also good enough to produce knowledge of the truth it entails
(i.e., ‘There are approximately 53 in attendance’). Many thanks to Claudio de Almeida for discussion here.
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three cases the counterevidence is encapsulated in a truth that could, at least in
principle, be taken to defeat the subject’s justification, it seems arbitrary for Peter
to say that justification gets defeated in one case but not in the other. It seems
that, in general, there is nothing in Defeasibility itself that allows us to state,
in a principled way, when counterevidence epistemically defeats knowledge and
when it does not. Call this the indeterminacy problem for Defeasibility.
Peter has, of course, addressed the indeterminacy problem in anumber of his
writings, but I am not convinced his main strategy is fully satisfactory. Let me
reconstruct this strategy here.23 When considering some particularly tricky cases
where the subject has a justified true belief but it is not so clear whether there is
a defeater preventing her from knowing, Peter suggests that it is a virtue of De-
feasibility that it neither necessitates nor precludes the existence of a defeater.24
To illustrate this point consider the following case:25
Newspaper
A political leader is assassinated and the local newspaper reports the
event accurately. The whole island, including Smith, reads about it.
He reads the newspaper and believes, on that basis, that the leader has
been assassinated. However, the leader’s party, fearing a coup, later con-
vinces an otherwise reliable TV channel to televise the false story that a
member of the security team, not the leader, has been killed. Although
everyone on the island believes the televised piece of fake news, dismiss-
ing the ‘rumor’ that the leaderwas assassinated, Smith is unaware of the
broadcast.
23Peter used to call this problem the ‘problem of misleading defeaters’ but he has recently dropped this descrip-
tion of the problem, and for a good reason: since, according to Peter, misleading evidence against what one knows
is just counterevidence that does not defeat knowledge; calling a misleading defeater a ‘defeater’ is just confusing,
for defeaters, by definition, do defeat and the so—called ‘misleading defeaters’ do not defeat. See (Klein, 2017).
24(See, for example, Klein’s discussion of theMr. Magic case in (Klein, 2003).
25This is a version of a case presented by (Harman, 1973, p.143—144).
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Does Smith know that the political leaderwas assassinated? Peter argues that
it is a virtue of Defeasibility that it is compatible with a positive and a negative
answer to this question. According to Defeasibility, which answers we give de-
pends on whether we take the true proposition a reliable TV channel said that
a member of the security team, not the leader, has been killed to be a defeater of
Smith’s justification. If we think Smith knows, thenwe should not consider it to
be a defeater; if we do not, then we should not. As I said before, this kind of re-
ply on behalf of Defeasibility is less informative than one would have hoped for.
We expect that analysans in a correct analysis of knowledge to be more informa-
tive than its analysandum and that this means, in turn, that finding out whether
the latter is satisfied in a case should take explanatory priority over whether the
former is satisfied in that case, not the other way around.26 But this expectation
is frustrated by Peter’s approach to the indeterminacy problem.27
I do not take this problem to be a knockdown argument against Defeasibil-
26Objection: It is vaguewhether Smith knows or not in this case, andDefeasibility does exactlywhatwewant it to
do— it explains clear cases of knowledge/ignorance. Reply: The relevant accusation (what I mean by ‘less informa-
tive than onewould have hoped for’) is thatwe look for defeaters only afterwe decidewhether there’s knowledge in a
relevant case. This gets things backwards, explanatorily speaking. As in science, we want philosophical theories that
predict what type of evidencewe are likely to find (whether wewill find knowledge in a case or not) and not theories
that only account for evidencewe already have (whether cases thatwe already knowhave knowledge/ignorance con-
form to the theory). My claim is that Defeasibility has poor predictive power. Consider. The claim ‘All emeralds are
green’ tellsme that, for any x, if x is not green, then x is not an emerald. This conditional exploits the analysans (so to
speak) of ‘emerald’ and suggests a method for finding emeralds (i.e, looking at the color of things and disregarding
things that are not green). Similarly, ‘All knowledge is undefeated belief’ suggests that, for any x, if x is defeated (if
there is a defeater), then x is not knowledge. This conditional exploits the analysans of ‘knowledge’ and suggests
a method for finding knowledge (i.e., looking for defeaters and disregarding beliefs for which there are defeaters).
However, while I can look for non—green things even if I do not know whether there are emeralds present or not,
I do not see how I can look for defeaters without first knowing whether there is knowledge present or not. This
is not good. It might not ‘refute’ Defeasibility, but it’s a problem that should be addressed, I think. Also, it is not
so clear that it is vague whether the subject knows or not inNewspaper. Nozick (1981, p.177), for example, thought
it was a virtue of his proposed definition of knowledge that it explained ‘why we are reluctant to say [the subject
in Newspaper] knows the truth.’ According to him, condition 4 in his definition of knowledge (i.e., if p, then S
would believe that p) predicts the right result in that case— that the subject fails to know. What this tells me is that
Nozick did not think the subject knew, that he thought that his theory explained why this was the case and that this
conformed with what he took to be people’s general inclination about the case. Harman (1973, p.145) also argued
that Smith did not know and that this was a problem for his account. Thanks to Joao Fett for discussion here.
27A similar point applies to some versions of the Grabit case, which was originally presented in (Lehrer &
Thomas Paxson, 1969). See (Klein, 1981) for Peter’s treatment of the Grabit case.
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ity. Rather, I wanted simply to illustrate the kind of challenge any weak view of
knowledge faces.28
V
I now turn to a recent version of the strong viewof knowledge. Iwill suggest that
it too faces important limitations. I will then briefly suggest one way in which
these limitations can be remedied.
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2010) has recently defended a version of the strong
view of knowledge. As such, the view states that counterevidence can never epis-
temically defeat knowledge. She does, however, want to explain why some have
the defeat intuition (i.e., the inclination to think that subjects in cases such as
Marbles/Marbles* have their knowledge epistemically defeated by counterevi-
dence). According to Lasonen-Aarnio, although ‘these intuitions are mistaken,
subjectswho retain knowledge in defeat cases are genuinely criticizable.’ In other
words, although Lasonen—Aarnio does not think that knowledge can be epis-
temically defeated, shewants to give an accountofwhy subjectswho retainknowl-
edge when confronted with counterevidence deserve to be criticized.
According to her, those subjects are criticizable because they do not follow
belief—forming policies that are rational for someonewith the goal of acquiring
knowledge to adopt. Quite the opposite, says Lasonen—Aarnio; to the extent
that those subjects manifest the disposition to retain a belief in the face of coun-
terevidence, they are following an epistemic policy that oftenprevents false belief
28In fact, one might even say that this way of looking at the indeterminacy problemmakes Defeasibility circular,
for whether condition (4) is satisfied depends in part on whether the subject knows. In my view, this limitation of
belief—first versions of the weak view of knowledge gives credence to a knowledge first version of the weak view:
instead of explaining knowledge in terms of defeat (i.e., what explainswhyone knows,whenonedoes, is the fact that
one’s justification for believing is undefeated), we should explain defeat in terms of knowledge (i.e., what explains
why one’s justification is undefeated is the fact that one knows). I only mention this here, however, as I do not
have the space to elaborate on this approach to defeat. See (Baker-Hytch & Benton, 2015) for a similar criticism of
reliabilist versions of weak views.
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from being extirpated by new evidence, for this subject is also disposed to retain
false beliefs in the face of new evidence. Hence, for Lasonen—Aarnio, the mis-
taken intuition that there is epistemic defeat in cases such asMarbles/Marbles* is
explained by the fact that we have a tendency to think that when a subject is not
acting reasonably, she lacks knowledge (Lasonen-Aarnio, 2010, p.15). That is, we
mistakenly take a subject’s unreasonability in believing to mean that this subject
fails to know what she believes. Lasonen-Aarnio (2010, p.16) says that asking
whether a belief is reasonable is a ‘useful heuristic’ for determining whether this
belief amounts to knowledge, but she rejects the notion that one’s belief’s being
reasonable is a necessary condition on knowledge.
Even though this view is initially attractive, its account of the defeat intuition
is in tensionwith central features of any strong view of knowledge. Consider the
claim that being disposed to retain knowledge in the face of counterevidence is
an indication that one is also disposed to retain belief in situations where one is
confronted with counterevidence but one has a false belief. Why think that this
is the case? That is, why should we think, with Lasonen—Aarnio, that someone
who is disposed to retain knowledge in a circumstance inwhich counterevidence
is present is ipso factodisposed to retain a false belief in similar circumstances? For
one thing, it is logically possible for a reasonable person to have one disposition
without having the other (at least for some cases or classes of cases). For instance,
I may be disposed to retain knowledge of simple arithmetic truths in the face of
counterevidencewhile, at the same time, being disposednot to retain false beliefs
about the same subject matter, for the mistakes are easy to spot with the help of
new evidence provided, for example, by a calculator.
Perhaps what is behind Lasonen—Aarnio’s suggestion is something like the
following line of reasoning. Justification is fallible; that is, it is possible for S and
S* to be equally justified in believing that p even though S knows that p and
S* has a justified but false belief that p. Since justification is fallible and one’s
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disposition to retain knowledge and belief is to a good extent determined by
how justified one is, a disposition to retain knowledge indicates a disposition to
retain justified false belief, for, given the fallibility of justification, there need not
be any difference between how justified one is when one knows that p andwhen
one has a justified false belief that p.
The problem with this argument appears when we try to conjoin the claim
that justification is falliblewith the claim that knowledge cannot suffer epistemic
defeat. Lasonen—Aarnio’s view can have one or the other claim, but not both.
If knowledge is what the strong view of knowledge says it is, then it cannot be
the case that S is as justified as S* in believing that p but S knows and S* falsely
believes that p. This entailment holds for the simple reason that, according to
any strong view of knowledge, the justification of someone who believes falsely
that p may be epistemically defeated by new evidence but the justification of
someone who knows that p cannot. But, if S and S* were equally justified in
believing p, this difference in how resilient to defeat their justification is should
not exist. But it does. Hence, if knowledge is what the strong view of knowledge
says it is, then justification is not fallible. The upshot is that Lasonen—Aarnio’s
account of the defeat intuition loses considerable support. Her account of this
intuition relies on the claim that justification is fallible, a claim that does not jive
well with strong views of knowledge.
VI
I now suggest a way to provide strong views of knowledge with an explanation
of the defeat intuition that does not incur the difficulties I mentioned in the
previous section. I toowill presuppose that, althoughquite strong, this intuition
is ultimately unsound. My account gives a central role to justification, but it does
so in a way that coheres with strong views of knowledge.
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Someauthors in the knowledge—first literature29 (and elsewhere) havepointed
out that ‘justification’ most likely does not express one single concept. From our
argument in the previous section it follows that a strong view of knowledge has
to say that the false beliefs about hands formed by handles BIVs are not as jus-
tified as our knowledge of hands. What this shows is that if we want to hold
a plausible strong view of knowledge and, at the same time, say that the BIV’s
hand—belief is justified, then ‘justified’ must mean one thing when applied to
the BIV’s hand—belief and another when applied to our knowledge of hands.
One way to capture the relevant different senses of ‘justified’ in play here
is the following. First, we may say that the sense in which I am justified is the
same sense in which I know: I see that these are my hands, and this entails the
truth of my belief that I have hands. In fact, it is hard to think of a better reason
to believe one has hands than having seen that some things are one’s hands!30
Secondly, we may say that the sense in which a BIV is justified in believing she
has hands is the sense in which she has an excuse to believe she has hands, and
that she should therefore not be blamed for doing so — given how things seem
to her, she should be highly confident that she has hands. In fact, it is hard to
think of a better excuse to believe one has hands (when one has no hands) than
its seeming to one as if one has hands!31
According to this picture, if we are talking about justification as the thing
that is epistemically distinctive about knowledge, then we are talking about ‘be-
ing justified’ as having what Fred Dretske (1971) called a ‘conclusive reason,’ a
reason that would not be the case unless the target belief were also the case. I
would not have seen that I have hands unless I had hands. Justification, in the
sense in which we say that the BIV is justified in believing she has hands, is an
29For example, (Sutton, 2007), (Williamson, 2011), (Littlejohn, 2012), among others.
30This is similar to some versions of epistemological disjunctivism. For one such view, see (Pritchard, 2016).
31Williamson (2015) and Littlejohn (2012) make a similar distinction.
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entirely different beast, however. For one, it is not the case that its seeming to
her that she has hands is a conclusive reason for her to believe she has hands (i.e.,
it is not the case that things would not seem to her the way they do unless she
had hands). If we use this distinction (i.e., ‘justified’ as knowing vs. ‘justified’
as having an excuse) in an explanation of why some of us have the defeat intu-
ition, we get the following simple story: in cases where knowledge is allegedly
defeated by counterevidence, it seems to the subject as if what she knows is false;
this change in how things seem to her, in turn, leads her to blamelessly form a
belief in a false proposition (i.e., the negation of what she knows) and to stop
believing what she knows.
There are two crucial differences between those two senses of ‘justified.’
Firstly, having a conclusive reason tobelieve is anecessary conditiononknowl-
edge, but having an excuse isn’t— I do not need to have an excuse to believe that
p if I have a conclusive reason to believe that p. It is true, however, that there is
somethingwrong, epistemically speaking, with someonewho retains her knowl-
edge that p when she has a strong enough excuse to believe that not—p— cases
likeMarble/Marble* show thismuch. Mary knows at first that there is a red and
a black marble in the bag. It is because of the dynamic evolution in how things
seem toMary that she is (at first) justified in believing that there is a red and black
marble in the bag— in the ‘having an excuse’ sense of that term— and, then, as
she draws a red marble one thousand times she stops being justified.
Secondly, asMarbles/Marbles*makes clear, justification, understood as hav-
ing an excuse, can be defeated by new evidence, but justification, understood as
having a conclusive reason, cannot. As Mary draws a red marble one thousand
times, it stops seeming toher as if there is a red and ablackmarble in thebag. This
is not what happens toMary’s reason: the reason she has for believing that there
is a red and a black marble in the bag is the same throughout the case (i.e., she
saw herself putting those marbles in the bag). The changes in how things seem
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to the subject is what explains why counterevidence sometimes defeats knowl-
edge: when counterevidence to what one knows is strong enough, it makes the
known proposition seem false to one, and this, in turn, causes one to decrease
one’s confidence (and to lose one’s belief) in the known proposition; and, at the
same time, causes one to increase one’s confidence (and to form a belief) in the
denial of the known proposition.
As promised, this version of the strong view of knowledge takes counterev-
idence to defeat knowledge only via the loss of belief, not via the loss of one’s
justification to believe. In other words, there is only psychological defeat. The
defeat intuition is an illusion: we take Mary’s knowledge to be epistemically de-
feated because we recognize that, from Mary’s perspective, it seems as if there is
only a red marble in the bag. In general, the degree to which one is inclined to
think that subjects in situations such as Mary’s have their knowledge epistem-
ically defeated by counterevidence roughly matches how excusable one thinks
it is for subjects in those situations to ‘change their mind’ about the relevant
proposition.32
32This paper benefited from the feedback of many people. Some of them read different drafts and were kind
enough to send me comments. Among those, I am especially thankful to Peter Klein, Claudio de Almeida, Joao
Fett, Felipe Medeiros and Gregory Gaboardy. Others let me pick their brains in conversations about some of the
issues in thepaper. Those includeMikeVeber,Nicola Salvatore, FredAdams, andRogel deOliveira. Many audience
members asked really smart and insightful questions about the presentations based ondifferent parts of this paper. I
am specially thankful to the audiences at the following events: ameeting of the East CarolinaUniversity Philosophy
Club, the 1st Colloquium on Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, the XIII Epistemology Colloquium, and the
XVII Meeting of the National Association of Graduate Programs in Philosophy. I also gave a version of this paper
during a visit to East Carolina University in January 2018. I am grateful especially to the faculty in the audience:
George Bailey, Josh Collins, Nicholas Georgalis, Jay Newhard, and my host Mike Veber were particularly generous
with their comments. I am grateful for their help. Part of the research for this paper was funded by the Sao Paulo
Research Foundation through a post—doctoral research grant. I amgrateful for their support. Finally,many thanks
to the two other editors for this volume, Cherie Braden and Branden Fitelson, for their support and patience as I
failed tomeet (almost) all the deadlines for this paper. Cherie also sent me detailed written comments on a previous
draft and saved me frommaking many mistakes. I am grateful for her help making this paper better.
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